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Abstract 
This study investigates whether board diversity attributes as recommended by the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance is relevant and effective in curbing misuse of share repurchases policy. Based on 275 firm-year 
observations among share repurchasing firms between 2006 and 2010, we find that ethnic diversity can help curb 
the potential misuse of managerial discretion in deciding whether to frequently repurchase their own shares. Our 
study contributes to the existing literature on board characteristics in several ways. First, it provides evidence that 
board diversity in terms of ethnicity can significantly affect companies’ policy. We find that companies with less 
diverse board as measured by ethnic group are more likely to  frequently embark on share repurchase which have a 
detrimental effect on current earnings. Second, we find that a large number of directors on the board can 
significantly reduce the tendency of managerial opportunistic behaviour. Finally, having independent directors 
alone does not guarantee companies are free from unwarranted opportunistic behaviours. Therefore, the study 
provides early evidence of the efficacy of recent Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 which 
recommended diverse balance of board members to ensure proper monitoring role and curbing the likelihood of 
unwarranted managerial opportunistic behaviour by unduly controlling owners.  
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1. Introduction
The Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 marked the year of significant change in Malaysian corporate 
distribution policy. Beginning November 1997, all Malaysian public listed companies are allowed to 
repurchase or buy back their own shares by properly following strict procedures as prescribed by the 
Companies Act, accounting guide through Technical Release and Bursa Listing Requirements (Laws of 
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Malaysia, 1965; Bursa Malaysia, 2009; MASB, 1999) Share repurchases were meant to help 
companies to stabilize their share prices during a depressed global market. Few companies were 
interested in buying back their shares in the inception years, but the trend is growing. Reference (Abdul 
Latif, 2010) finds the number of companies announcing share repurchases have amplified from only 16 
companies in 1999 to 106 companies in 2005, an increase of almost 12 fold.  
Share repurchases have always been assumed to signal an undervaluation (Hung & Chen, 2010). 
Companies alleged that their prices are undervalued and believed that better price performance is on 
the way. On the contrary, (Abdul Latif, Taufil Mohd, Wan Hussin, & Ku Ismail, 2013; McNally & 
Smith, 2007) find that there is no significant difference in long-run price performance between share 
repurchases group and the control group regardless of different measurements used. Not all share 
repurchases are created equally. Regulations and market structures could impose different implications 
to the types and practices of share repurchases worldwide. For example, companies in the United States 
and Australia have more options on the types of share repurchases method available (Bartov, 1991). 
Companies, depending on their needs, have the option to use either fixed tender offer, Dutch auction 
tender offer or open market share repurchases. In contrast, only open market share repurchases are 
allowed for Malaysian companies. Studies on emerging market are still limited thus warrant further 
investigations. We examine whether the recent improvement in Malaysian corporate governance code 
regarding board diversity can help curb the potential misuse of managerial discretion in deciding 
whether to frequently repurchase their shares. Our study contributes to the existing literature on board 
characteristics in several ways. First, it provides evidence that board diversity can significantly affect 
companies’ policy. We find that companies with less diverse board as measured by ethnic group are 
more likely to  frequently embark on share repurchase which have a detrimental effect on current 
earnings. Second, we find that a larger board size can significantly reduce the tendency of managerial 
opportunistic behaviour. Finally, having independent directors alone does not guarantee companies are 
free from unwarranted opportunistic behaviours. 
2. Literature review 
 Early studies on share repurchases acknowledged significant positive effects on companies’ price 
performance. Bartov (1991) finds companies earned positive surrounding share repurchases 
announcements whilst Ikenberry, Lakanishok and Vermaelen (2000) document favourable market 
reactions on long-run performance. On the other hand, reference Abdul Latif et al., (2013) do not find 
any significant difference in price performance following actual share repurchases. The study finds that 
in the long-run (1 to 3 year period) price performances are equivalently similar regardless of the 
method employed (CAR and buy-and-hold returns model) or the benchmark used for control 
companies. Similarly, reference McNally and Smith (2007) find that there are no abnormal returns 
following actual share repurchases using previously documented data. 
Other studies argue that companies are repurchasing shares to fulfil managerial intentions (Abdul 
Latif, 2010; Kahle, 2002; Rodriguez, 2008, Hribar, Jenkins & Johnson, 2006).  Based on managerial 
opportunism hypothesis, Rodriguez and Yue (2006) find evidence to support that managers can 
carefully plan and time repurchase activities so as to meet earnings expectations. Using 2,939 
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repurchase announcements during 1980 to 1998, the study finds significant evidence that companies 
strategically manage earnings downward prior to actual share repurchases. By doing so, companies are 
able to buy back shares at a lower price. Later, if share prices unpredictably rise, the repurchase 
companies will earn abnormal gains. Similarly, Dui and Marciukaityte (2015) document positive 
association between earnings management through discretionary accruals before share repurchases. 
The study argues that companies manage earnings as an attempt to smooth expected earnings. 
Assuming that the managerial opportunism hypothesis hold, managers who also hold a significant 
interest in the companies’ equity would be the ultimate beneficiaries. Regardless of what the intentions 
are, earnings management in whatever method is considered detrimental if it would intentionally cause 
any party to suffer losses.   
A study by Farrell, Yu and Zhang (2013) suggests that good corporate governance mechanisms are 
vital in curbing the likelihood of earnings management through share repurchase activities. The study 
document  a strong relationship between the likelihood of earnings management and  less independent 
board and the presence of CEO Duality, where CEO holds both positions as the chairman of the board 
as well as the managing director. Without proper intervention, CEO Duality could be very detrimental 
to companies’ future performance. One of the principal importance’s on board characteristics is board 
diversity. Board members can be of different diversity type, including ethnicity, gender, or experience. 
Diversity on boardroom has gained much attention from researchers, analysts, corporations, regulators 
and shareholders (Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014; PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2014). A survey by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2014) indicates that demand for board diversity, whether in the form of 
gender or ethnic diversity is increasing. Some countries such as in the US and UK may have even 
requested that the company provides quotas for diversity implementation. 
3. Data methodology 
The study examines the importance of board characteristics on share repurchase frequencies.  
Following Farrugia, Graham and Yawson (2011), share repurchase frequency is defined as the number 
of times a company initiates’ share repurchases in the period under study.  The company is considered 
as a frequent repurchase if it initiated three or more times repurchases in a five-year span. Sample 
companies were collected from all actual share repurchases embarked by nonfinancial public listed 
companies between 2006 and 2010. To ensure visibility of the results, only share repurchases 
exceeding 0.1 percent of ordinary shares outstanding were included. A total of 770 shares repurchase 
observations commenced between 2006 and 2010. Out of these, 405 observations involved share 
repurchases of less than 0.1 percent of their shares outstanding leaving 275 observations suitable for 
analysis. The following equation was executed to examine the relationship between board 
characteristics and the frequency of share repurchases,  
 
FREQUENCY it = β0 + β1REPURCHASEit + β2TOTDIRit+ β3EXECDIRit + β4INDDIRit + β5CDIRit + 
β6CEPSit+ β7SIZEit+ εit                                                       (1) 
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Where, 
FREQUENCY : A binary code which equal to 1if the frequency of share 
repurchases is 3 or more times in a 5-year period, otherwise 
the code is 0. 
REPURCHASE : The total number of repurchase shares scaled by the number 
of outstanding ordinary shares. 
TOTDIR : Total number of directors. 
EXECDIR : Percentage of executive directors serving on the board of 
directors. 
INDDIR : The percentage of an independent board of directors serving 
on the board. 
CDIR : The number of Chinese directors serving on the board of 
directors. 
CEPS : A measure of performance. It is the change of earnings per 
share calculated as earnings per share minus “as if earnings 
per share”. “As if earnings per share” is calculated assuming 
share repurchases have not occurred previously. 
SIZE : The size of the company i at time t, measured by the natural 
log of total assets. 
E  : The error term. 
 
4. Results and analysis 
Table 1 presents the descriptive analysis of sample companies. On average, sample companies 
repurchased their own shares more than 3 times in a five-year span. This means that companies in 
Malaysia are frequent buyers. In contrast, companies in United States repurchase their shares 
infrequently, only once in three years (Jaganathan). The percentage of shares repurchased for the 
sample firms are quite small with an average (median) of 1.7 percent (1 percent). Unlike companies in 
the United States and Sweeden, the reported average percentage of open-market share repurchase 
program is about 8 and 3.5 percent respectively (Jagannathan & Stephens, 2011; Ridder, 2015) 
Table 1. Descriptive analysis 
 
Mean Median Min Max Standard deviation 
Frequency 3.70 4.00 1.00 5.00 1.27 
No of shares repurchased 9,615,961 2,442,800 138,500 187,836,600 24,762,862 
RM Shares repurchased 25,121,811 3,543,998 55,890 1,079,914,500 103,773,706 
Repurchase (%) 1.7% 1.0% 0.1% 10.0% 2.0% 
TOTDIR 7.93 8.00 5.00 14.00 1.85 
EXECDIR 3.52 3.00 1.00 9.00 1.72 
INDDIR 3.33 3.00 1.00 7.00 1.01 
CDIR 5.43 6.00 0.00 11.00 2.26 
MALAYDIR 2.16 2.00 0.00 9.00 1.63 
INDIANDIR 0.16 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.61 
TOTAL ASSETS 2,141,660 532,696 36,538 34,689,180 5,374,326 
LNTA 13.40 13.19 10.51 17.36 1.33 
EPS 1.016 0.135 -0.263 59.570 5.011 
ASIFEPS 0.995 0.079 -0.280 64.426 5.258 
CEPS -0.021 -0.019 -0.374 4.857 0.306 
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Sample companies have on average 8 directors serving on the board. Out of this, about six or 75 
percent of them are of Chinese ethnicity (CDIR) and only two of them are Malays MALAYDIR).  
Indian (INDIANDIR) and other ethnic group are insignificant. Yearly distribution of director’s 
ethnicity is indifferent. Despite the growing appeal for diversity, the proportion of ethnic groups 
serving on public listed companies remained fairly unchanged. Between 65 and 69 percent of board 
members are of Chinese ethnicity while only 25 percent is indigenous or Malays. On average the 
change in earnings per share (CEPS) is negative 0.021 cents, which means that if companies had not 
repurchased their own shares, the earnings per share would be worse than currently reported in 
earnings per share. ASIFEPS is the calculated earnings per share assuming companies did not 
repurchase their shares. Based on the results companies may have decided to buy back their own shares 
to improve or smooth their reported earnings per share. 
To assess the association of board of director attributes and frequency of share repurchases events, 
relevant variables are checked for correlation and covariant. The correlation between Chinese directors 
(CDIR) and Total directors (TOTDIR) is 0.75 while the correlation between Chinese directors (CDIR) 
and executive directors (EXECDIR) is 0.5. However, none of the pairwise correlation is significantly 
higher than 0.9 suggesting that the impact of multicollinearity is not severe. This study employed a 
reasonably large observation. Gujarati (2003) implied that observations exceeding 100 independent 
observations are large, thus the normality assumption does not assume a critical role.  
Table 3. Probit regression analysis using robust standard error 
 
 
 
 
 
*,**,*** denotes significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level using a two-tailed test. 
Results are equivalently similar for logit model using robust standard error. 
 
The results suggest that frequent repurchases involved smaller volume of shares repurchase and 
deteriorating earnings performance measured by change in earnings per share, CEPS. The more 
frequent companies repurchase their own shares, the lower is their current change in earnings per 
shares.  The coefficient for executive directors is negative as expected, but not significant thus provide 
no support to the expectation. It is expected that independent director plays a significant role in 
controlling managerial opportunistic behavior, but the result is positive and not significant.  Likewise, 
SIZE is not associated with frequency of share repurchases decision. 
5. Conclusion 
We examine whether the recent improvement in Malaysian corporate governance code regarding 
board diversity can help curb the potential misuse of managerial discretion in deciding whether to 
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frequently repurchase their shares. We find that board diversity as measured by director’s ethnicity is 
significantly associated with frequency of share repurchases. The less diverse is the board, the more 
likely a company will frequently embark on share repurchases. Second, we find that a large number of 
directors on the board can significantly reduce the tendency of managerial opportunistic behaviour. 
Finally, having independent directors alone does not guarantee companies are free from unwarranted 
opportunistic behaviours. Therefore, the study provides early evidence of the efficacy of recent 
Malaysian code on corporate governance 2012 which recommended diverse balance of board members 
to ensure proper monitoring role and curbing the likelihood of unwarranted managerial opportunistic 
behaviour by unduly controlling owners. Future study may examine whether control and power of 
independent and ethnic directors entail better monitoring and fiduciary duty. 
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